The payment of interest on reserves held at the central bank has long been advocated [see, for example, Friedman's A Programfor Monetary Startlrfy (1960)1. Advocates note that the payment of a market rate of interest on required reserves eliminates the oppornrnity cost of holding those deposits that are-subject ,to reserve+equirements.In economies of infinitely lived representative agents, the distortion of reserve requirements is cosdessly removed if these interest payments are funded through lump-sum taxes. Smith (1991) demonstrates, however, that the payment of interest on reserves, even if financed through lump-sum taxation, actually reduces steady-state utility in economies of overlapping generations of finitely lived agents. The increased rate of retum on deposits increases the demand for deposits and thus for reserves, lowering the price level and thus increasing the wealth of the initial owners of reserves. The taxes on futwe generations to finance interest on reserves thus effect a transfer of wealth from future generations to the initial generation. This loss of wealth makes future generations worse off despite the increased rate of retum on deposits, Smith establishes the Pareto optimality of interest on reserves but wams that only the initial generation gains from fuancing interest through taxation, even if lump-sum.
In this paper, we establish that not paying interest on reserves is Pareto inferioc there is a way to recapture for the future generations benefits that accrue incidentally to the initial generation as a result of the payment of interest on required reserves, allowing a Pareto improvement. Following Auernheimer's (1974) prescription for "honest" seigniorage, we propose an open market purchase by the cenral bank that offsets the cahnge in money demand through an expansion of the monetary base, so as to leave unchanged the price level and the wealth of the initial generation.l The interest from the assets thus purchased by the central bank are used to help finance the payment of interest on reserrr'es; reducing the taxation of future generations. We show that when financed in this way, the payment of interest on reserves results in a Pareto improvement, incrcasing the welfare of the future genentions without hurting or helping the initial generation.
We go on to show that the elimination of reserve requirements accompanied by a similarly motivated open market sale of government debt can also rcsult in a Pareto improvement. Steadystate utility is incrcased even after future generations are taxed to finance the intercst on the government debt.
Finally, we demonstrate that financing interest through distorting taxes is still a Pareto improvement. We introduce a second type of capital, which is not subject to reserve requirements but which may be taxed. We then show that an equal tax on both forms of capital is Pareo improving when used to pay interest on reserves. This result demonstrates how rcserve requirements distorts individual choices between intermediated and uninterrnediated capial.
Spreading the tax across these two types of capital is in the spirit of tlre Ramsey Rule of efFrcient I This open market purchase has the same motivation as the open market sale proposed by Bacchetta and Caminal (1990) to offset intergenerational wealth transfers when a govemnrent financing expenditures from seigniorage reduces reserve requirements and increases the rate of money expansion, 2 taxation, so that even a distoning tax on two t)?es of capital raises welfare compared to the case in which one is subject to a reserve requirement without interest.
l. Interest on R€serves l.l The Model
The model economy is Smith's (1991) version of the overlapping model with reserve requirements.2 There is an infinite sequence of periods indexed by t=L,2,3,.... Agents live two periods. Within each period t, two generations coexist --those in the first period of their life (the "young") and those in the last period of their life (the "old"). There are N agents bom in each period t > 1. In the initial period, t=1, there are also N 1-period lived agents called the initial old.
There exists two assets -fiat money and storage. Each of the initial old agents is endowed with a per capita stock of the storage good and fiat money balances, denoted k6 and ms, respectively. Romer (1985) , Sargent and Wallace (1985) , and Freeman (1987) .
3 The separability ofthe utility function is not essential to rhe arguments but we wish to follow Smith's assumptions and notation closely to facilitate comparison. 3 but nothing when old. The problem facing agents is how to finance consumption when old.
The two assets--fiat money and storage-offer different rates of return. When stored, the consumption good rcturns x > 1 units of the consumption good in period t+1 for each unit sored in period t. Because-x >'1r we r+ill-interpr€t ftis storage option as equivalent to capital. The initial old own I\4o (= Nnd units of fiat money. Fiat money is intrinsically useless and noncounterfeitable. The young can trade a unit of the consumption good for p1 units of fiat money.
In period t+1, the old (the young of period t) trade each unit of fiat nnney for l/pa1 units of the consumption good. Thus, the rate of return to fiat money balances held by the initial old is p,/p,*1.
Each young agent is required to hold a fraction lofhis total real savings Q5 in reserves of fiat money:
(1) z1 > TQr.
In every period after the initial period, required reserves pay p units of fiat money in net interest for each unit held in required reserves. Thus for t > l, the real renrm to a required unit of fiat money is p(1+ p)/pr*1 @ut only p,/p,*1 if held beyond the level required). A lump-sum tax of t units of the consumption good is collected from each old agent. Except for the initial old, the lump-sum tax revenues are then used to pay interest on required reserves.4
In addition to collecting taxes and paying interest on reserves, we will allow the 4 We could also tax the old in the initial period in order to pay interest on tbe initial fiat money stoclc This would be a lump-sum tax to pay an equal lump-sum benefit. We ignore the possibility because it would have no real effect 4 govemment to expand the money supply from It46 to M in order to purchase and store Kc goods in the initial period.s
Equilibrium conditions
Each young agent born at t chooses his personal savings Qq taking taxes and the real gross retum on savings (call it R1) as given, o maximize U(c1) + V(c2) subject to equation (1), along with the following budget constraints
The first-order condition for this program is
We focus our attention on those cases in which the reserve requirement constraint is binding; that is, x > p/p1*1. When zs -T Qt, the retum to the agents porfolio is a weighted average of the return to capital and to money:
The clearing of the market for fiat money requires (6) M = ptTNQt.
5 The government's capital purchases arc equivalent to a case in which the govemment has outstanding government debt and uses the expanded money supply to retire some part of the debt.
5
In an equilib,rium with real saving equal ro a constant Q, the price level p will also be constant and the rate of retum to savinss wili be the constant
The govemmcnt budget constraint in the initial period requircs that the proceeds of the open market purchase be used to purchase government capital:
In subsequent periods govemment revenues include the net return on storage/capital (gross value less replacement costs) plus the lump-sum tax on the old. Expenses are the interest payments on reserves. Formally, in a stationary equilibrium
In short, a stationary equilibrium is a vector (Q, R, p) that depends on a policy vector (Ke, p, t)
such that all the equilibrium conditions equarions (2)-(9) are satisfied and equation (1) When no interest is paid on reserves, R = R = 1l-fx + l and the resulting equilibrium 6 level of savings Q is given bye (10) u'0 -Q) = Rv'(t (l-y)x + Tl0).
From (6), the equilibrium price level is i = Mo/y N Q.
When the matket rate of interest is iraid on ieserves and frnanced endrely through taxes on the old, we have that p = x-l and 1 = pM/p* , where p* is equal to MdI'{Q* and Q* satisfies
Smith demonstrates that paying interest on reserves encourages savings (ff > Q), thus increasing the demand for reserves, lowering the price level (p* . p ).2 Smith's Proposition 3 establishes ftat all generations except the initial old are worse off when interest is paid on reserves and financed in this way, The initial old are better off with interest paid on reserves because the the lower price level increases the value of their initial fiat money balances. The two equilib'ria are therefore not Pareto comoarable.
Equilibria with open market operations
The initial old benefit from the oavment of interest on reserves but onlv later 6 Our T equals l-Q as Q was defined by Smith.
7 The wealth effect of the increased rate of retum is exactly offset by the taxes required to pay the interest, leaving only a substitution effect. hoof: The proof proceeds in two steps. Fint, we derive the tax level necessary to finance interest payments on reserves, taking into account the op€n market purchase needed to offset the change in the real demand for reserves. Second, given the policy constraints we find steady-state utility as a function of Q and determine the Q that maximizes steady-state utility. We then frnd the rate of interest on reserves that, in equilibrium, will lead agents to choose this utility maximizing Q.
Using the market clearing conditions Ms/p = fNQ and tr4p = f{Q, we can find the following reduced-fonn expression for taxes:
(r7) r = (p + 1-x)yQ + (x-1)y0 .
.Recalltom (7) that the rate of rctdm on saVirigs in a steady sthie is R = (l_-T)x + {1+ p)
Together, (3), (7), and (17) permit us to find c2 = R Q -r, or
which after some simplihcation of terms is
Steady-sate utility can now be expressed as a function of Q: From (4) and (7), dtis condition is met in equilibrium ifand only if reserves pay the market rate of interest, i.e.,if l+e =x. Q.E.D.
The intuition behind the proposition is fairly straightforward-Only when the marginal rate of substitution equals the rate at which goods can be transformed into future goods can the level of savings be optimal. 
Eliminating Reserve Requirements
A more straighforward way to increase the rate of retum to saving is the simple abandonment of reserve requirements. This action alone benefits future generations at the expense of the initial generation, whose initial balances of fiat money become worthless (for p1).
Therefore, the elimination of reserve requirements can only be shown to be a Pareto improvement if the initial generation can be compensated for dreir loss. We will show that an open market sale of t1 government debt in exchange for the initial reserves [proposed by Auemheimer (1974) and Bacchetta and Caminal (1990) 
Distorting Taxes
The analysis above depends on lump-sum taxes for the financing of interest payments.
Real world govemments, however, are apparently constrained to distorting taxes. Should one still advocate the payment of interest on reserves when that intercst must come from distorting taxes?
The answer will depend on what is taxed to pay interest. If assets subject to resewe requirements (storage in this model) are taxed at a constant marginal rate in order to make proportional interest payments on reserves, the after-tax rate of return is not changed by the payment of interest.
Certainly, however, intermediated deposits are not the only taxable quantity. lrt us therefore inmoduce another taxable economic variable in order to inquire as to whether distorting taxes on another variable should be introduced to reduce the distortion imposed by interest-free required reserves.
In addition to the storage technology, let there be a capital technology of this form: an t4 investment of any positive \ goods in period t by any individual will produce fft) goods in period t+1. It produces in no other period. The function f(.) is continuously differentiable, increasing, and concave with f (0) = "" and f (y) < x. We assume that storage is only possible in amounts greater than an individual's endowment y. Agents are thus only able to sore through intermediaries that pool the endowments of many agents. As before, a reserve requirement is imposed on storage (intermediated deposits) but not on capital (which requires no intermediation).9
We will confine our attention to steady-state equilibria in which both storage and capital The pavment of interest on reserves will be financed bv a tax of ct, times the return from any asset (0 < cr < 1). The govemment will also engage in an open market operation that maintains an unchanged price level. The govemment must finance n€t interest on reserves of (x-lfiS -K) from uxes on the retum from savings, crx(S -K) + cfffi) and from the interest on the capital it
acquires from the open market purchase in the initial period, (x-1)t{(S -Xj -15 -t)1. Altogether this implies that
The individuals first-order maximization conditions with market interest paid on reserves may be summarized as: Paying interest on reserves makes future generations bener off if for any given level of savings, S = S*, the total rcturn net of taxes is greater when interest is paid on reseles:
We can now use the govemment budget constraint (28) to cancel several of the tax terms with terms on the right hand side of (3 I ) leaving us with
We know that K > K because unintermediated capital is taxed when interest is paid on reserves, Widr f(.) as a concave function (capital has a diminishing marginal product), the Mean Value Theorem implies that
When interest is paid on reserves, we know from (30) that the two forms of capital must offer the same marginal rate of return, i.e., f(K) = x. It follows that the inequality (33) is satisfied, proving that future generations are better off with interest paid on rcserves even if it must be financed through a distorting capital tax. Q.ED.
At fnst glance Proposition 3 may be counterintuitive; intercst payments inuoduce a distortionary tax where there was none before. The explanation is that reserve requirements 1.7 without interest payments act like a distorting tax even if they raise no revenue. The existence of a second type of capital, not subject to reserve requirements, is important for this result lnterest frnanced by taxes spreads the distortion introduced by resef,ve requirements across both intermediated and. unintermediated eapitalr -'In-this senser the linear tax on capital improves welfare for essentially the same reason that the Ramsey Rule for efficient taxation is welfare improving.
Summary and Conclusions
This paper shows that Friedman's proposal to pay interest on reserves maximizes steady state welfare, assuming that the burden is financed with lump-sum taxation and accommodating open market purchases. This result modifies the Pareto non-comparability rcsult presented in Smith.
We further show that abandoning reserve requirements is equivalent to paying inter€st on reserves, provided that the initial old are compensated. This compensation is financed by an open market sale of bonds whose interest is funded from lump-sum taxes.
The accommodation schemes considered here are often observed. There is evidence that central banks routinely offset changes in reserve policies with open market operauons. Muelendyke (1991) asserts that the Federal Reserve smooths the effects of changes in resewe requirements.
Using different measures of changes in reserve requirements, Haslag and Hein (1989, 1993) provide evidence suggesting that the Federal Reserve systematically accommodates decreases in reserve requirements, for example, letting the quantity of high-powered money fall.
Finally, we demonstrate that interest payments on reserves results in higher steady-state welfare (given an accommodating open market purchase) even if financed with a distortionary tax applied against capital. It-is importantthardistonionary tax is applied to unintermediated capital, as well as intermediated capital, which underscores the distonion imposed by reserve requircments.
In short, sprearling a distortion across the two types of capital is more efficient than disorting only intermediated caoital. lo lo It should be noted that the policy implications ofthis paper apply to all forms of frat money, not just reserves. The commonly imposed prohibition on the issuance of private currency is in essence a reserve requirement of l00%a. Dropping this prohibition or paying interest on fiat currency will thus also result in a Pareto improvement when accompanied by an accommodating open market operation.
